

Message Text

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21

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI

AMEMBASSY SANA

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

S E C R E T STATE 145606

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINR, MU, YS, UR, XO

SUBJECT: INR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET-PDRY RELATIONS

REF: MUSCAT 531 (NOTAL)

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1. IN DISCUSSING CURRENT SOVIET POLICY IN REGARD TO PDRY WITH SULTAN QABOOS, YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING.
2. SOVIET POLICY IN THE NORTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN REGION, AS

ELSEWHERE, IS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE SOVIET INFLUENCE TO THE DETRIMENT OF WESTERN INTERESTS AND TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF CHINESE INFLUENCE. THE SOVIETS WOULD LIKE TO BE THE DOMINANT POWER IN THIS REGION AND HAVE TAILORED THEIR MILITARY EFFORTS ACCORDINGLY.

3. THE SOVIETS' INDIAN OCEAN SQUADRON GIVES THE SOVIET UNION THE ABILITY TO SHOW THE FLAG FOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE AND MAINTAIN A MODEST MILITARY CAPABILITY IN THE AREA. THIS FACTOR WILL BECOME MORE SIGNIFICANT WHEN SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPPING IN THE AREA INCREASES FOLLOWING THE OPENING OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

4. ALTHOUGH ACCESS TO FACILITIES IN SOMALIA PROVIDES THE SOVIETS WITH A VIRTUAL BASE, THEY ALSO FIND UTILITY IN THE LIMITED ACCESS THEY ENJOY TO PORT FACILITIES IN ADEN.

ADEN, BEING THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL PORT IN THE REGION, IS USED FOR REFUELING AND REPROVISIONING. ALTHOUGH SOVIET PORT CALLS AT ADEN HAVE BEEN AT A MODEST LEVEL AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS REFUSED TO ALLOW THE SOVIETS TO ESTABLISH A NAVAL BASE, THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY HOPE ONE DAY TO EXPAND THEIR FACILITIES AT THIS STRATEGIC PORT. THE OFT-DISCUSSED CONSTRUCTION OF A LARGE DRY DOCK FACILITY BY THE SOVIETS, THAT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR BOTH SOVIET AND SOUTH YEMENI USE, IS ONE WAY THE SOVIETS COULD EXPAND THEIR PRESENCE.

5. SOVIET USE OF ADEN AS A PRIMARY PORT FOR THEIR INDIAN OCEAN FISHING FLEET HAS HEIGHTENED SOVIET COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA.

6. PDRY, SINCE ITS ESTABLISHMENT, HAS HAD A MARXIST GOVERNMENT ENJOYING CONGENIAL RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. PDRY'S ATTEMPTS TO INTRODUCE RADICAL POLITICAL THOUGHT INTO THE CONSERVATIVE ARABIAN PENINSULA STATES HAS, UNTIL RECENTLY, BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE SOVIETS TO
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BE IN THEIR INTEREST. SOVIET CONSTRUCTION OF A LARGE SHORT-WAVE TRANSMITTER WAS IN PART TO AID ADEN IN THE DISSEMINATION OF PROPAGANDA.

7. THE SOVIETS HAVE PROVIDED PDRY WITH A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF MILITARY ADVISORS AND ARMAMENTS. IN ADDITION, UPWARDS OF \$54 MILLION HAS BEEN EXTENDED IN ECONOMIC AID TO THE IMPOVERISHED STATE.

8. IN SPITE OF THIS CONSIDERABLE ASSISTANCE, SOVIET INFLUENCE UPON THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES HAS BEEN MODEST. ALTHOUGH IN MANY AREAS SOVIET GOALS AND THOSE OF PDRY COINCIDE, WHERE THEY DISAGREE SOUTH YEMENI LEAD-

ERS ACT IN THEIR OWN PERCEIVED NATIONAL INTERESTS AND
NOT ON SOVIET ADVICE.

9. AREAS OF CURRENT PDRY AND SOVIET POLICY DIFFERENCES
INCLUDE PDRY'S SUPPORT OF THE PFLO AND THE EXPORT OF
REVOLUTION TO NEIGHBORING STATES. THE SOVIETS HAVE NO
ILLUSION ABOUT THE POSSIBLE SUCCESS OF PDRY'S EXPORTATION
OF MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARIES
THROUGHOUT THE PENINSULA. CURRENTLY, THIS SUPPORT
APPEARS CONTRARY TO SOVIET INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELATIONS
WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND THE OTHER CONSERVATIVE GULF STATES.
ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ALTERED
LAST SUMMER'S POLICY OF CAUTIONING MODERATION IN DHOFAR,
PDRY HAS EXPANDED ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE DHOFAR REBELS.
PDRY'S ACTIONS REFLECT A GROWING CONCERN AMONG OFFICIALS

IN ADEN THAT A TOTAL COLLAPSE OF THE REVOLT IN DHOFAR
WOULD PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OMANI FORCE ON THE
UNDEFINED BORDERS OF THE SIXTH GOVERNORATE. KISSINGER

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